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ABSTRACT 
The internationalization of R&D activity by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is increasing, with 
a recent big push towards emerging economies. Understanding how MNEs organize 
collaborative R&D across geographies is therefore an important area of scholarship. However, 
little attention has been paid towards understanding the factors that influence the division of 
innovative labor within an MNE across geographies – the internal division of innovative labor. 
Drawing on the literature that shows that strong protection for intellectual property (IP) is 
important for the efficient division of innovative labor between firms, we argue and show that 
differences in effectiveness of IP protection between international locations significantly 
influences the internal division of innovative labor, especially for R&D aimed at the host market 
when compared to R&D aimed at the home market.  
 
Keywords: Division of innovative labor, Intellectual Property Regimes (IPR), R&D offshoring, 
Multinational R&D strategy, global organization of work, knowledge spillovers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The internationalization of R&D activity by multinational enterprises (MNEs) is an important 
and growing phenomenon. Prior work on MNE R&D strategy has mostly concentrated on why 
firms choose foreign locations to perform R&D and how they integrate R&D activities between 
the subsidiary and headquarters. However, little attention has been paid towards understanding 
the factors that influence the division of innovative labor within an MNE across international 
(host) and headquarter (home) countries (henceforth the internal division of labor). In this paper 
we focus on one such factor, the strength of the intellectual property regime (IPR), which has 
been shown to have a significant influence on the division of innovative labor between firms. We 
find that the IPR strength at the host location influences the involvement of host country 
inventors differentially for R&D projects aimed at the home versus host markets. Our findings 
examine an important aspect of MNE strategy, the internal division of innovative labor, from a 
fresh theoretical perspective: the strength of the IPR at the host location. 
Division of labor and the resulting gains from specialization lead to greater efficiencies in 
production. Since ideas face a revelation problem, protection for of intellectual property (IP), 
such as effective patents, is necessary for the efficient division of innovative labor (Arrow, 
1962). An effective patent regime facilitates trade in knowledge and enables firms to specialize 
in technology production (R&D) or in downstream activities (manufacturing, marketing), 
depending on their comparative advantage (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2004; Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994; 2010; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 2006; Ceccagnoli, 2009), 
increasing efficiency in the industry overall. When the IPR is weak, the fruits of R&D will likely 
leak out to competitors. The threat of IP leakage is thus a friction in the market for ideas, leading 
to distortions in the efficient division of innovative labor (Gambardella, 2005). 
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Whereas prior work has investigated the role of strong IPRs in the efficient division of 
innovative labor between firms, this issue is perhaps equally important within firms. The 
influence of the strength of the IPR on the internal division of innovative labor is likely to be 
most salient to an MNE’s R&D strategy, since MNEs operate R&D subsidiaries at several host 
locations with differing levels of IP protection. Ideally, MNEs make resource allocation 
decisions on staffing R&D projects from different locations based on production considerations 
such as differences in scientist wages or the knowledge available at the different locations. Weak 
IPRs at the host location will likely impede such efficient resource allocation since MNE 
managers must now also take into account the cost of IP leakage when performing R&D in these 
locations. This suggests that the strength of the IPR in the host country is likely to have a 
significant impact on the internal division of innovative labor in MNEs. Surveys on the 
internationalization of R&D suggest that managers emphasize the importance of the IPR at the 
host location (Thursby and Thursby, 2006),1 providing anecdotal evidence for our conjecture. 
However, generally, prior work on MNE R&D strategy has not studied how the strength 
of the IPR where a subsidiary is located (henceforth host location) influences the internal 
division of innovative labor. This is an interesting omission, since prior work suggests that 
MNEs locate R&D units internationally to take advantage of the knowledge available there 
(Chung and Yeaple, 2008; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Kogut and 
Chang, 1991; Anand and Kogut, 1997). Among these studies, a few explicitly argue that 
spillover from R&D conducted by other firms at the host location is an important consideration 
for R&D location decisions (Chung and Yeaple, 2008; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Almeida, 
1996). The strength of IPRs at the host location presumably influences the extent of spillovers 
and also whether a firm can appropriate value from its IP. However, surprisingly, these studies 
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 See also “Special report on innovation in emerging markets,” The Economist, April 17, 2010.  
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do not consider how the strength of the IPR at the host location influences the internal division of 
innovative labor in an MNE between headquarters and the host location. 
In this paper we apply insights from the literature on how the IPR influences trade in 
technology to understand how the strength of the IPR at the host country influences an MNE’s 
internal division of innovative labor. We argue that firms need to balance innovation production 
considerations, such as factor prices and access to knowledge at the host location against the cost 
of IP leakage due to a weak IPR in deciding the extent of host or home inventor participation in 
R&D projects. We expect that the threat of IP leakage differentially affects R&D projects aimed 
at the host versus those aimed at the home market. Therefore, we are likely to see different 
patterns of internal division of innovative labor between host locations with a strong IPR versus 
those with a weak IPR in these two kinds of projects. 
We test our hypotheses using a novel dataset of a matched sample of patents assigned to 
MNEs headquartered in the US that includes patents invented in the US on the one hand, and 
patents that were partially or fully invented in the UK or India, on the other hand. We chose 
India because it is one of the two largest host destinations with a weak IPR, whereas the UK is an 
important host destination that has had a uniformly strong IPR over the past few decades (Lerner, 
2009). We distinguish between different kinds of R&D projects based on whether the patent was 
filed at the home location or at the host location. We compare the involvement of host and home 
inventors on these different kinds of patents by estimating a set of within-firm regressions. 
Since a stronger IPR reduces the threat of IP expropriation, we find that, on average, a 
stronger IPR at the host location increases the participation of inventors from that country. 
Moreover, a significant amount of R&D conducted at the host location is targeted at the home 
market. The strength of the host country’s IPR has little influence on the internal division of 
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innovative labor on R&D projects aimed at the home market, though it has a significant impact 
on R&D aimed at the host market. Since R&D has globalized but IP laws remain country 
specific, our findings have interesting implications for R&D internationalization by MNEs. 
Our key contribution is to highlight the role of IPRs on the internal division of innovative 
labor, an important but neglected component of MNE R&D strategy. Concerns about IP 
protection are important not just in trade (between firms) in technology; they also influence 
resource allocation and therefore R&D efficiency within firms. Though decisions regarding the 
internationalization of R&D by MNEs starkly illustrates its importance, our theory is also 
applicable to multi-unit R&D settings with different spillover risks, for example, changing trade 
secrecy laws in different states in the US (Marx, Singh and Fleming, 2011) or the presence of 
direct competitors at a location (Alcácer and Zhao, 2012). Methodologically, ours is one of very 
few papers that use data on host country patents, instead of relying exclusively on US patent data 
to understand MNE R&D internationally, which is arguably a better indicator of innovation in 
host countries than self-reported data or measures such as foreign direct investment. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on MNE R&D strategy, 
specifically the choice of R&D location and collaboration between MNE units. We argue that 
though this literature emphasizes the importance of knowledge access, prior work has not looked 
at the importance of host country IPR strength on the internal division of innovative labor. Next 
we develop a framework for how IPR influences MNE R&D staffing decisions and propose 
several hypotheses, followed by a description of our data and analysis techniques. We then 
present our findings, discuss their theoretical implications, and conclude by presenting avenues 
for future research to enhance our understanding of how IPRs influence MNE R&D strategy. 
5 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The decision by MNEs to conduct R&D at a foreign location is influenced by a variety of 
factors, broadly classified as demand- and supply-side factors. While supply-side factors include 
considerations such as access to cheap skilled labor, knowledge from local clusters, and the 
potential for spillovers, demand-side factors include market potential, the need for customization, 
market sophistication, and political considerations (Cheng and Bolon, 1993; Demirbag and 
Glaister, 2010; Flores and Aguilera, 2007). Based on these factors, several authors have 
classified the types of R&D activity performed at host subsidiaries (Ronstadt, 1977; Kuemmerle, 
1999a; Håkanson and Nobel, 1993). In contrast to this work, we do not examine the factors that 
determine the choice of location. Rather, we take the host location as given and examine how 
R&D activity is distributed between the host and home locations. 
Another stream of work has examined how MNEs integrate knowledge. The knowledge-
seeking view of MNE strategy concludes that the ability of an MNE to leverage knowledge 
across locations is critical to its competitive advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989). A large body of work focuses on the mechanisms that facilitate knowledge 
transfer between MNEs headquarters and subsidiaries (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991). A 
preponderance of empirical work focuses on knowledge transfer between two locations in 
developed economies, both of which presumably have a strong IPR. Although this stream of 
work focuses on the mechanisms of knowledge transfer (such as frequent communication 
between subsidiary units), it does not shed light on the factors that influence the internal division 
of innovative labor in MNEs. 
Complementary to this work, several scholars have investigated where knowledge flows 
within an MNE. Conceptualizing the MNE as a knowledge network, this stream seeks to 
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understand which subsidiaries receive high or low levels of knowledge inflows and outflows 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). For example, in some MNEs the 
headquarters transfer knowledge to subsidiaries, whereas in others the subsidiaries interact with 
each other (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997); and some subsidiaries remain isolated in the MNE 
knowledge network (Monteiro, Arvidson and Birkinshaw, 2008). Several factors, such as the 
richness of local knowledge, geographic and cultural distance, influence how integrated a 
subsidiary is in an MNE’s knowledge network (Frost, Birkinshaw, and Ensign, 2002; Hansen 
and Løvås, 2004; Almeida and Phene, 2004). Work in this stream does not consider how the IPR 
at the host country impacts the internal division of innovative labor, which presumably 
influences the relative position of the subsidiary in the knowledge network. This omission is 
particularly salient, since collaboration between international units of an MNE has been shown to 
result in better-quality R&D (Alnuaimi, Singh and George, 2012b; Singh, 2008; Lahiri, 2010). 
Given this, it is perhaps more important to protect such knowledge from leaking out to 
competitors and therefore organizing (internal division of labor) for such R&D may be more 
sensitive to leakage considerations. 
We believe that the limited inquiry into the internal division of innovative labor within 
MNEs is a consequence of an implicit assumption that a preponderance of the researchers that 
work on MNE R&D strategy make: that the headquarters and host locations have access to 
different knowledge and in collaborative work, each location specializes in knowledge that is 
uniquely available to it. However, broader research on knowledge integration in organizations, as 
in alliances and acquisitions, suggests that a certain amount of knowledge overlap between units 
is necessary to fruitfully recombine knowledge (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003; Kotha, George, and Srikanth, 2013), a point that is also emphasized in the MNE 
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literature on headquarters–subsidiary interactions (Hansen and Løvås, 2004; Almeida and Phene, 
2004). Thus, to the extent that there is non-trivial overlap in knowledge between different units 
within an MNE, understanding the internal division of innovative labor becomes important. 
The new phenomenon of R&D offshoring further underscores the importance of 
understanding the internal division of innovative labor. MNEs perform R&D in host countries 
such as India and China because of the availability of inexpensive talent in these locations 
(Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2009).2 They suggest that the difference in factor prices allows 
firms to produce innovations inexpensively from offshore locations (see also Grossman and 
Helpman, 1993; Branstetter et al., 2007) and that such talent is increasingly used to generate 
innovations not just for the host market, but also for the home market (Kumar and Puranam, 
2012; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). Moreover, the scale and scope of MNE R&D performed at 
offshore locations has rapidly increased (Hegde and Hicks, 2008) and recent findings suggest 
that innovations generated at these locations may have even higher internal impact than 
comparable innovations generated in advanced economies (Alnuaimi, George and Puranam, 
2012a; Zhao, 2006). In essence, these studies suggest that the home and host locations may have 
access to very similar knowledge. Therefore MNE managers need to make decisions regarding 
the division of labor across home and host locations while taking into account production 
considerations such as cost and access to knowledge, on the one hand, and IPR concerns, such as 
potential losses from the leakage of proprietary IP, on the other. Prior studies on MNE R&D 
have not addressed this issue. 
Studies that do consider the impact of the strength of the IPR at the host location on MNE 
R&D do not report how IPRs influence the internal division of innovative labor. Zhao (2006) 
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 See also Robinson, (1988) and the National Science Foundation (1990) who suggest that US-based MNEs establish 
R&D in foreign locations because of talent scarcity at home.  
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argues that MNEs organize their R&D in weak-IPR locations with tight internal linkages. 
Empirically, she shows that patents generated by MNEs at weak-IPR host locations and filed in 
the home market (in the US) have more forward self-citations than patents generated in strong-
IPR host locations, which, she argues, is indicative of tight internal linkages. Alnuaimi et al. 
(2012a), however, suggest that higher forward self-citations are indicative of innovation quality, 
which may be a consequence of distributed R&D (see also see Singh, 2008; Alnuaimi et al., 
2012b) and need not necessarily be a function of weak IPR. 
Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) show that foreign subsidiaries pay higher royalties 
to headquarters after the host location IPR has been strengthened and argue that this is indicative 
of the MNE transferring more technology to host countries with a stronger IPR. They also show 
that MNEs file more patents in the host country after the IPR is strengthened. However, it is 
unclear whether this technology transfer is aimed at producing innovations for the home or host 
market and whether the additional host country patents were generated by headquarters, the 
subsidiary, or in collaboration. In addition, the findings from these different studies are not 
comparable. Zhao (2006) studies innovations aimed at the home market, since the analysis 
involves patents filed in the US, but invented elsewhere. Branstetter et al. (2006) do not clarify 
whether the innovations are aimed at the home market or the host market, though part of their 
study analyzes patents filed in the host market, but it is unclear where these were invented. 
In sum, these studies do not reach any conclusions regarding how the strength of the host 
country’s IPR influences the internal division of innovative labor between an MNE’s 
headquarters and its subsidiary. We are unaware of any study that shows how a change in the 
IPR at the host location influences the involvement of host versus home inventors in different 
kinds of innovations. Our effort is directed precisely at this question. 
9 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Consider a scenario in which an MNE R&D manager has to allocate labor input to an R&D 
project. We assume that an R&D project can potentially utilize two types of labor input, both of 
which are owned by the same focal MNE: the labor input of an inventor located at MNE 
headquarters (henceforth home inventor) and that of an inventor located at the host facility 
(henceforth host inventor). Along similar lines, we refer to the headquarters location as home and 
the foreign location as host. We assume that the two kinds of labor inputs are imperfectly 
substitutable. Since our goal is to examine how the internal division of innovative labor varies 
with the strength of the IPR at a host location, we state all our hypotheses in terms of the 
proportion of host country scientists employed on an R&D project, which can vary between zero 
and one; a project can involve no host inventors, no home inventors, or anything in between.  
To fix ideas, we assume that the cost of generating an innovation consists primarily of the 
labor costs of the home and host country inventors. We also assume that employing host country 
inventors is cheaper than employing home inventors. The host inventors can reduce R&D costs 
by either having lower wage rates or bringing to bear specialized expertise that reduces the 
number of man–hours spent in the project. We also assume that the home location has a strong 
IPR.3 Offshoring R&D can pose an equivalent or greater threat of IP leakage compared to that at 
the home location, depending on the strength of the IPR at the host location. 
In our framework, the threat of IP leakage arises from employing host inventors on an 
R&D project. Prior work has shown that employee mobility is a significant source of knowledge 
transfer between firms and that such spillover tends to be geographically localized (Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale, 2006). In this 
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 Historically, MNE R&D internationalization has typically occurred with firms in developed economies, such as the 
US setting up R&D centers in other developed economies, such as the UK, which has a strong IPR, or in developing 
economies such as China, which has a weak IPR. This assumption dovetails with our empirical analysis.  
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spirit, in our framework, IP leakage occurs when a host country inventor gets hired away by a 
competitor that uses some of the knowledge acquired from the focal MNE, to its detriment. Such 
“poaching” impacts the focal MNE in two ways: First, competitors can utilize the expropriated 
knowledge to invent workarounds to the focal MNE’s patents or even supply the proprietary tacit 
knowledge required to effectively utilize the focal MNE’s patented knowledge. Second, 
competitors may utilize proprietary tacit knowledge of the MNE to develop and patent the next 
innovation before the focal MNE can and thereby leapfrog it. 
Any legal IPR affords two broad mechanisms for firms to protect their IP: patents and 
trade secrets. Patents protect a specific piece of IP at the necessary cost of disclosure. Firms often 
choose not to disclose their IP and instead rely on trade secrets, enjoying limited legal protection 
for such IP (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Ideas under development, until they are 
sufficiently refined to warrant a patent application, are also necessarily protected as trade secrets. 
Whereas patented ideas are protected by the strength of patent laws, trade secrets are mainly 
protected by using non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) and more importantly, by using non-
compete agreements that restrict the mobility of employees between competitors (Valiulis, 1985; 
Marx, Strumsky and Fleming, 2009; Marx, 2011). 
A weak IPR at the host location implies that IP can leak over to a competitor more easily. 
This is because of at least two reasons: First, a weak patent regime presents very few remedies to 
an inventor whose patents have been infringed upon by a competitor, which consequently 
incentivizes the infringement of patented knowledge.4 Second, weak trade secrecy protection 
provides limited remedies to a firm that seeks to prevent its employees from using its proprietary 
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 For example, until recently, drugs could not be patented in India, giving rise to an industry that thrived by selling 
in India copies of drugs invented by other firms and patented in other countries, such as in the US. However, these 
copycat versions could not be sold until patent expiry in the US. Similarly, Cisco has had limited success in its 
patent infringement claims against Huawei in China, although it was successful in these claims in the US. 
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IP for private gain. Hyde (2003) argues that violations of NDAs are hard to detect and prove and 
therefore enforcing non-compete agreements that discourage employee mobility from the focal 
firm to competitors is the principal mechanism for protecting trade secrets (Valiulis, 1985; Marx 
et al. 2009; Marx and Fleming, 2012). When trade secrecy laws are weak, NDAs and non-
compete agreements are virtually unenforceable.5 There is significant evidence suggesting that 
employee mobility can lead to IP leakage, especially of tacit knowledge and trade secrets from 
the focal firm to competitors (Marx et al., 2009; Almeida and Kogut, 1999). 
The greater the number of host country inventors in an R&D project, the greater the 
probability that one of them will leak out proprietary knowledge to a competitor. Therefore, the 
probability of IP leakage at the host location increases with the number of host inventors. Thus, 
in sum, involving host country inventors can reduce labor costs but can also increase costs from 
IP leakage. The goal of an MNE R&D manager is to minimize the total cost of an innovation by 
optimally choosing the number of host and home country inventors for a focal R&D project, that 
is, the internal division of innovative labor. 
Effect of the strength of the IPR at the host location on the share of host inventors 
Consider an innovation that features a mix of home and host country inventors. If personnel 
employed by the focal MNE are hired away by competitors, the focal MNE will likely entail the 
risk of losing two types of knowledge: First, competitors can expropriate the focal MNE’s 
proprietary IP held as trade secrets. Second, hired-away employees can also facilitate imitation 
or inventing around of patented knowledge by sharing proprietary tacit knowledge with 
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 For example, in India, although the Contract Act of 1872 contains provisions to prevent the employee of an 
innovator from using its proprietary IP for the employee’s private benefit and to the detriment of the innovator, it is 
very difficult to enforce. In addition, the constitutional “right to work” awarded to every citizen prevents the use of 
non-compete agreements, resulting in significant personnel mobility between the focal firm and its competitors and 
consequent spillover of trade secrets. Similarly, China also does not enforce non-compete agreements and Chinese 
firms often poach MNE employees to gain access to their trade secrets (see “China and Intellectual Property,” New 
York Times, December 24, 2010, p. A22, New York edition).   
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competitors. Strong IPRs constrain employee mobility across competitors and also provide better 
legal recourse to prevent competitors from infringing patents. Therefore, in a host location with a 
strong IPR, both patents and trade secrets are protected from expropriation. In contrast, host 
locations with a weak IPR neither protect patented knowledge nor protect trade secrets. 
All else being equal, a weaker IPR at the host location increases the probability that a 
host country inventor can expropriate IP. A decrease in IPR strength increases the likelihood of 
IP leakage and therefore should increase the cost of involving host inventors in an MNE R&D 
project. At partial equilibrium, this should result in a decrease in the number of host scientists 
involved in an R&D project. Since the labor inputs are imperfectly substitutable, a decrease in 
the number of host scientists should also increase the number of home scientists. In essence, this 
implies that the proportion of host scientists in a patent should be lower when IPRs are weaker at 
the host location. We formally state this as the following baseline hypothesis. 
H1: The proportion of host inventors in an R&D project is lower when the IPR at that location is 
weak than when it is strong. 
Joint effect of the strength of the host location IPR and the innovation’s intended end-use 
location on the share of host inventors 
Next we investigate how the nature of R&D, more precisely, whether R&D is produced for the 
home market or the host market modifies the main effect of the strength of the IPR at the host 
location. The literature suggests two broad objectives for MNEs to offshore R&D. The first is to 
explore new growth opportunities in host markets (Rugman, 1981; Mansfield, Teece and 
Romero, 1979). The second is to inexpensively produce innovations for the home market 
(Kumar and Puranam, 2012; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). We henceforth refer to a project 
produced for the host location (in which the host inventors also reside) as a host R&D project. 
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Similarly, we henceforth refer to a project produced for use in the MNE’s home market as a 
home R&D project. 
Exploiting growth opportunities in host markets requires an MNE to invest in R&D that 
creates new products or tailors its existing products to cater to the preferences of customers in the 
host market. Since these inventions are mainly valuable in the host market, appropriating value 
from them mainly depends on the strength of the IPR at the host location. Recall that the weaker 
the IPR at the host location, the greater the risk of IP leakage there. Therefore, the greater the 
number of host inventors employed in a project at a location with a weak IPR, the greater the 
threat of expropriation, as described earlier. All else being equal, this means that employing 
additional inventors from a host country with a weak IPR becomes more expensive. Therefore, 
the focal MNE is likely to involve fewer host inventors from weak-IPR host locations and 
consequently more home inventors in projects aimed at that host market than comparable 
projects conducted in strong-IPR locations. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
H2: The proportion of host inventors in a host R&D project is lower when the host location has 
a weak IPR than when it has a strong IPR. 
MNEs subsidiaries in host countries perform R&D for the home market as well as for the 
host market. Several scholars have argued that much of the recent R&D conducted by MNE 
subsidiaries in India and China is aimed at the home (or developed) market (Mudambi, 2011; 
Zhao, 2006). In a home R&D project, in contrast to a host R&D project, the MNE’s proprietary 
IP that is patented at home is protected by the strong IPR at home. Thus, even if an MNE 
employee at the host location defects to a competitor and enables the competitor to utilize 
knowledge that belongs to the focal MNE, insofar as such knowledge is patented at home, the 
strong IPR in the home country will enable the MNE to seek legal recourse against such 
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infringement. Patent rights are territorial and are normally confined to the country in which the 
patent is filed.6 Therefore, the strength of patent protection in the host destination is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on protecting innovations aimed at home, insofar as these innovations 
are patented at home. 
However, the strength of patents is only one aspect of an IPR, the other being the strength 
of trade secrets. Weak trade secret protection at the host destination, especially emanating from 
the mobility of the focal MNE’s employees to competitors, can affect the focal MNE’s ability to 
appropriate value from its IP, even on home R&D projects. This is because competitors can 
expropriate tacit knowledge from the focal MNE’s former employees, which can be used to work 
around the focal MNE’s patents or leapfrog it by introducing new innovations. 
In essence, for innovations generated in a host location with a weak IPR, the main source 
of IP expropriation in home R&D projects is from the threat of leakage of trade secrets. In 
contrast, for host R&D projects, the threat of IP expropriation arises from both the leakage of 
patents and the leakage of trade secrets. Therefore, the IP leakage threat is likely to be greater for 
host R&D projects than for similar home R&D projects. Since the threat of leakage increases 
with the number of host inventors involved, it is likely that fewer host inventors are involved in 
projects aimed at the host market than in those aimed at the home market. Therefore, we propose 
the following hypothesis. 
H3a: In a host location with a weak IPR, the proportion of host inventors in a host R&D project 
is lower than in a home R&D project. 
In contrast to a host location with a weak IPR, a host location with a strong IPR 
safeguards against the leakage of both patented knowledge and knowledge maintained as trade 
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 For example, the recent conflicting rulings in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and Korea regarding patent 
infringement claims between Apple and Samsung suggest that patents confer a right to IP within a specific country 
and hold no relevance for competition in another country. 
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secrets. Consequently, the expropriation of proprietary IP belonging to the MNE is less likely 
when R&D is conducted in a host location with a strong IPR. To the extent that it is cheaper to 
involve inventors from the host location in an R&D project compared to home inventors, all 
other things held equal, the MNE is likely to employ more host inventors from a location with a 
strong IPR. This is more likely in a host R&D project because host location inventors are more 
likely to possess superior knowledge regarding the tastes and preferences of consumers in the 
host markets when compared to their counterparts at home. On the other hand, home inventors 
are likely to possess superior knowledge regarding preferences prevailing in the home market 
and are perhaps more likely to be involved in home R&D projects. Therefore, in host locations 
with a strong IPR, a reduction in host inventor involvement in a host R&D project compared to a 
home R&D project is less likely than when the host location has a weak IPR.  
This is because for innovations generated in a host location with a weak IPR, the 
proportion of host inventors involved in an R&D project apart from the knowledge and factor 
price differentials, also depends on the likely loss from the leakage of proprietary IP. As argued 
above (for H3a), this loss is likely to be higher for innovations produced for the host market 
when compared to similar innovations produced for the home market. In other words, the 
difference in the proportion of host inventors in host R&D projects compared home R&D 
projects when these are performed in a host location with a weak IPR is likely to be greater than 
the difference in host country inventors in host versus home R&D projects performed in a host 
location with a strong IPR. This suggests the following difference-in-differences hypothesis. 
H3b: The relative reduction in the proportion of host inventors employed in a host R&D project 
compared a home R&D project is greater when the R&D project is performed in a host location 
with a weak IPR than when it is performed in a host location with a strong IPR. 
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DATA and MEASURES 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of patents assigned to MNEs headquartered in the US and 
were invented in the US, India or the UK. For an MNE to be in our sample, it must have at least 
one patent exclusively invented or co-invented by a British inventor and at least one patent 
exclusively invented or co-invented in India. This criterion allows us to compare the extent of 
participation of host inventors from a strong-IPR country (UK) with that from a weak-IPR 
country (India) in an R&D project based on unique granted patents in our sample.7 
Our unit of observation is a patent. We assembled our sample from three sources: From 
the USPTO and PATSTAT we assembled patents filed in the US and UK that were assigned to 
MNEs that satisfy our sampling criteria. From the Indian Patent Office we collected the patents 
filed by these firms in India.8 Our data provides us with variation in filing location that enables 
us to proxy for home and host R&D projects. Since most international patenting is driven by 
trade or competition considerations, the patent filing location is a good proxy for whether the 
R&D project is aimed at the home market or the host market (Yang and Nai-Fong, 2008). 
We use two sources of variation to test our hypotheses. The first is variation in the host 
country at which a patent was invented. In our case we compared patents produced by one or 
more inventors residing in India with patents that were produced by one or more inventors 
residing in the UK and with patents produced exclusively in the headquarters country, the US in 
our sample. The second source of variation is the country in which the patent was filed. Here we 
compare home patents, i.e., patents filed in the US with host patents, i.e., patents filed in India or 
in the UK and co-produced by inventors residing in that country. 
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 In many cases, firms file the same patent in multiple countries. We matched every given patent to other patents in 
our initial list by International Patent Classification (IPC) class, assignee (including the subsidiary), inventors, and 
title to ensure that each patent in our sample was unique. 
8
 Parts of these are available at www.ipindia.nic.in and others were manually collected. 
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Patents that involve host inventors can vary systematically from patents that do not 
involve any host inventors in a variety of dimensions. Moreover, patents co-invented in India can 
systematically differ from patents co-invented in the UK along multiple dimensions. To 
minimize the possibility that our results are driven by systematic differences between patents that 
are unrelated to our hypotheses, we construct a matched sample of patents based on a set of 
observable patent characteristics for every assignee–filing year combination. 
We use the coarsened exact matching (CEM) technique to construct a matched sample of 
patents, as did Singh and Agrawal (2011). As these authors point out, CEM is useful to minimize 
any sample selection bias and also reduces the sensitivity of the regression results to specific 
functional form assumptions (see also Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012; Azoulay, Graf Zivin, and 
Wang, 2010). We implement CEM at two levels. First, for every patent that was co-invented or 
fully invented in either India or the UK we find an equivalent US-invented patent based on 
assignee, application year, main IPC class, number of inventors, the ratio of backward self-
citations made to patents produced in the MNE’s headquarters by total backward citations 
(henceforth backward ratio), and the ratio of forward self-citations by patents produced in the 
MNE’s headquarters to total forward citations (henceforth forward ratio). Then, using this 
subsample, for every patent invented in the UK we match an equivalent patent that was invented 
in India based on the same criteria as above. Thus for a patent to be in our sample, the focal 
patent must be in both the matched samples. Since our intent is to understand the influence of 
host IPRs on the share of host inventors on a patent, for clean identification purposes we also 
exclude patents co-invented at both India and the UK.9 
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 There were very few of these. After CEM matching on offshoring and offshore countries, we end up with 232 such 
patents.  
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We start with 138,685 patents held by US MNEs that met our sampling criteria, which 
we then matched as above. Descriptive statistics show that the differences on these parameters 
between home invented patents on the one hand and invented patents on the other were 
significantly reduced after matching. Similarly, the differences between patents co-invented in 
the UK on the one hand and co-invented in India on the other were significantly reduced after 
matching.10 In addition to matching, we further control for any remaining differences by adding 
the observable patent characteristics listed above as controls in our regressions.  
Table 1A provides the details of how we construct our final sample. Our final sample 
consists of 53,320 patents, of which 15,397 were fully or partially offshored to either India or the 
UK.11 Table 1B shows the breakdown of the number of patents by filing location and host 
location. Of the 15,397 offshored patents in our sample, about 41 percent were co-invented or 
exclusively invented in India, while the rest were co-invented or exclusively invented in the UK. 
About 47 percent of the offshored patents were filed exclusively in the US (home location) and 
about 13 percent of the patents were filed exclusively in the United Kingdom or India (host 
location). About 18 percent of the patents were filed in both the home and host locations and 
about 22 percent of the patents were filed neither at home nor at the host location. We now 
describe our empirical measures in detail. 
INSERT TABLE 1A AND TABLE 1B HERE 
Dependent variable 
Share of host inventors: The key dependent variable is the proportion of host inventors in 
a focal patent, henceforth share, which is measured as the total number of inventors from the 
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 These descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1 in the supplementary note attached to this paper.   
11
 We started with 138,685 patents held by US MNEs, of which about 23% were offshored; i.e., had inventors from 
India or the UK. After the matching procedures outlined above, we ended up with 53,320 patents.  
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host location divided by the total number of inventors listed in the patent and is our measure of 
the internal division of innovative labor.12 
Independent variables 
Strength of IPR at the host location: We use the dummy variable Weak = 1 if the focal 
patent was produced in India, a host location with a weak IPR. Similarly, we use another dummy 
variable, Strong = 1, if the focal patent was produced in the UK, a host location with a strong 
IPR. Patents produced exclusively in the US are the omitted category. Our classification is based 
on the fact that in most IPR indices, such as the OECD global competitiveness report of 2011–
2012, India receives a relatively poor score (3.5, ranked 68th) relative to the UK (5.7, ranked 
10th overall).13 The choice of the UK as a control group is also in line with prior work 
suggesting that the UK has had a strong and stable patent regime for a long time (Lerner, 2009).  
Location for which the invention is produced: We use four dummy variables to classify a 
patent into four mutually exclusive categories. To proxy for a home R&D project, we use home = 
1 to denote patents that were filed exclusively with the US patent office; Home = 0 otherwise. 
The proxy for a host R&D project is Host = 1 for patents filed with the UK patent office or 
patents filed with the Indian patent office and co-produced in those respective locations. Along 
similar lines, Both = 1 if the patent is filed in both the home and host locations and Neither=1 
when the patent is filed neither with the home patent office nor with the host’s.14 
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 In cases where the total number of inventors varies for a focal patent filed in different countries, we take the 
maximum number as the total number of innovators on a patent. Of the 15,397 offshored patents, there are 347 such 
cases. Similarly, we again take the maximum when the total number of offshore inventors varies for a focal patent 
filed in different countries. In our sample, there are 381 such cases.  
13
 The maximum possible value that this index can take is 7.0. To put these numbers in perspective, the top-ranked 
country is Finland, with an IPR index of 6.2, while the lowest-ranked country is Haiti, with an index of 1.6. An 
alternative index for the strength of the IPR, the Ginarte–Park index, assigns an average value of 4.88 for the US and 
4.54 for the UK compared to 2.42 for India, for the period 1990–2005. This index is scored on a scale of zero to 
five, where a score of zero indicates the weakest IPR and a score of five indicates the strongest (Park, 2008).  
14
 These classifications take into account all subsequent filings of a PCT patent. 
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Control variables 
R&D over sales: We control for the relative size of the R&D budget of the assignee firm 
of the focal patent using R&D over sales, which is the dollar amount of R&D incurred by a firm 
in a year divided by its total sales. We lack this measure for 39 assignees, predominantly entities 
that are not publicly listed and hence not available from Compustat. In regressions, we control 
for missing values using R&D not reported dummy =1 if R&D or sales data are missing. 
Size: We control for the size (henceforth log size) of the assignee firm using the number 
of employees of the focal MNE, as a natural log. Similar to our measure of R&D intensity, we 
lack this measure for 39 assignees, which we control for by using R&D not reported dummy. 
Time dummies: We control for time effects using 35 time dummies, one for every 
application year in our sample. The year of patent filing ranges from 1974 to 2009. 
Industry dummies: It is plausible that the patents in some industries are more imitable 
than in others. Moreover, the tacit knowledge required to utilize a given patent can vary between 
industries. We hence also control for unobserved industry-specific effects in our regressions. To 
construct industry dummies, we map each patent to a three-digit SIC code using the 2005 IPC–
SIC concordance of the USPTO.15 Using this classification, we include 28 two-digit SIC code 
fixed effects to control for any industry effects.16 
Firm fixed effects: We also control for firm-specific effects that can influence the division 
of labor between an MNE and its subsidiary by using 746 firm fixed effects. 
Innovation complexity: We control for an innovation’s complexity by using the number 
of claims on the focal patent (as a log, henceforth log claims). In our sample, we do not have 
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 Available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/brochure.htm, last accessed 11/12/2012. 
16
 The main categories are chemicals and pharmaceuticals (19%); electronic and electric equipment (23%); industrial 
and commercial machinery (21%); measuring, analyzing, and controlling equipment (11%); rubber and plastics 
(6%); and transportation equipment (5%). The omitted category comprises 531 patents that could not be mapped to a 
two-digit SIC code. 
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claims for all patents.17 In our regressions we control for missing data using claims not found 
dummy = 1 when claims for a focal patent are missing. 
Utility of the innovation to the focal MNE: It is plausible that the extent to which an 
innovation is valuable to the innovating MNE influences the division of innovative labor 
between geographies. We control for the extent to which the focal innovation is useful to the 
innovating firm by using the ratio of the number of forward self-citations to the total number of 
forward citations for the focal patent (forward ratio). Patents with higher forward ratios are 
relatively more valuable to the focal firm. 
Proprietariness of knowledge: We also control for the extent to which the focal patent is 
proprietary to the focal MNE by using ratio of backward self-citations to total backward citations 
of each patent (backward ratio). A patent that is highly proprietary is less likely to be valuable 
when expropriated by a competitor. Thus it is plausible that the extent of host inventor 
participation in a patent is sensitive to its proprietariness. 
Originality and generality: We also control for the originality and generality of a patent, 
using the patent measures of originality and generality. 18 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the independent variables. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
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 We were unable to collect the number of claims for 2015 patents. Most of these relate to patents filed before 1984. 
18
 We were unable to find the forward or backward citations for 249 patents. For these patents we assigned average 
values for the focal patent’s filing country, technology class, and filing year cohort for the utility of the innovation, 
the proprietariness of the knowledge, originality, and generality. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We begin with a non-parametric analysis of the data. In Table 3, we distinguish between the 
filing location and the location in which patents were co-invented and analyze how the share of 
host inventors in a patent (share) varies with both these dimensions. As suggested by H1, Table 
3 suggests that patents that were co-invented at host locations with a weak IPR on average have a 
lower share than patents co-invented at a host location with a strong IPR. We also see that 
among patents filed in the same host location as they were invented, the share is lower on patents 
that were co-invented in a host country with a weak IPR relative to patents co-invented in a host 
country that has a strong IPR (difference -0.28, p-value < 0.01), supporting H2. Though not 
hypothesized, it is interesting to note that this difference in shares in home patents is only -0.03, 
suggesting that the influence of the host IPR on share in home R&D projects is limited. Among 
patents co-invented in a host location with a weak IPR, those filed in the host location have a 
lower share than those filed at the home location (difference -0.22, p-value < 0.01), supporting 
H3a. This difference in share between host- and home-patents co-invented in the location with a 
strong IPR is 0.03. Supporting H3b, we also find that the relative reduction in share between 
patents filed at the host location relative to those filed at the home location is greater for patents 
co-invented in a weak-IPR country than for those patents co-invented in a strong-IPR country 
(difference -0.25; p-value < 0.01). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Note that since we have matched patents based on their observable characteristics, these 
differences are unlikely to be driven by heterogeneity in R&D projects conducted at these 
locations. However, the non-parametric analysis does not control for a variety of other factors 
that might influence these differences. Accordingly, we turn to regressions. 
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In Table 4, we start by exploring how the strength of IPR at a host location influences 
share. Since identifying the main effect of the host country’s IPR on the share of host inventors 
involved requires only variation in the strength of the IPR at the host location, we initially only 
include the weak and strong dummies in the regression. The omitted category comprises patents 
that were invented exclusively in the US, for which share is zero by definition. Thus, we 
estimate how share on a patent p that belongs to an assignee i offshored to a host location m filed 
at location k at time t in technological class j varies by the host location at which the focal patent 
was co-invented as follows:  
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where Xi is a vector of assignee characteristics that include assignee fixed effects, Yj is a vector 
of technology characteristics that include industry fixed effects, τt is a vector of time effects that 
include filing year dummies, and λp includes a vector of other patent characteristics such as the 
number of claims and forward and backward ratios. Although our dependent variable is a 
proportion whose values range between zero and one, for simplicity we use a linear specification. 
However, for robustness, we also implement a fractional logit specification (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 1996) and show that our results are qualitatively similar. 
In Table 4, specification 1, along with the main independent variables of interest, we 
begin by including 35 filing year dummies, 746 assignee fixed effects, and 28 two-digit SIC code 
dummies. In addition, we include controls that vary by both assignee and time, using R&D over 
sales and log size along with our control for missing data. In specification 2, we further control 
for patent characteristics using forward ratio, backward ratio, and log claims. In specification 3, 
we additionally control for the originality and generality of a patent. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
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Hypothesis 1 argues that more host inventors from strong-IPR locations are likely to be 
involved than host inventors from weak-IPR locations in otherwise similar R&D projects, or α1 -
α2 < 0. From Table 4, specification 1, we see that on average share at host locations with a weak 
IPR is about 14 percent lower. Specifications 2 and 3 suggest that further controlling for 
observable patent characteristics by using forward ratio, backward ratio, originality and 
generality does not change our results much. Given that we already matched patents based on the 
same observable characteristics, this is expected. These results support H1. 
Next, to test H2 to H3b, we distinguish between the host location at which the focal 
patent was co-invented as well as the location(s) at which the patent was filed. We estimate:  
ℎ	
 = 	 +  +  ∗ !"	 + # ∗ !$	 + %!"	 + &!$	
+ '(ℎ	 + )*+ℎ	 +  +  + 

 +  + 	
 
(2) 
The omitted category comprises patents that were not offshored, in which, by definition, 
the proportion of host inventors is zero. Therefore in (2), when the IPR is weak at the host 
location (i.e., Weak = 1), β2 + β4 estimates share on a home R&D project and β3 + β5 estimates 
share for a host R&D project. Similarly, when the IPR is strong at the offshore location (i.e., 
Weak = 0), β4 estimates the share of host inventors on home R&D projects and β5 estimates 
share on host R&D projects. The results are shown in specification 4 of Table 4. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that share on a host R&D project is lower when the IPR at the host 
location is weak than when it is strong; i.e., β3 <0. Specification 4 of Table 4 suggests that 
patents that are both co-invented and filed at host locations with a weaker IPR have on average 
about a 19 percent lower share relative to patents co-invented and filed at strong-IPR host 
locations, supporting H2. 
Similarly, H3a suggests that when the IPR is weak at a host location, the share is lower 
on a host R&D project than on a home R&D project. In (2) above, as noted earlier, when Weak = 
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1, share for a host R&D project is β3 + β5, which is 0.70 (std. err. 0.02), whereas share on a home 
R&D project is β2 + β4, which is 0.88 (std. err. 0.01). The difference (β3 + β5) – (β2 + β4) = -0.18 
(std. err. 0.03; p-value < 0.01). This supports H3a. 
Hypothesis 3b argues that the relative reduction in share between a host R&D project and 
a home R&D project when Weak = 1 is greater than a similar reduction when Weak = 0. Stated 
otherwise, the test for H3b is {(β3 + β5) – (β2 + β4)} − (β5 - β4) < 0, or just (β3– β2) < 0. Table 4 
suggests that β3 - β2 = -0.17 (std. err. 0.02; p-value < 0.01), supporting H3b. 
H3a and H3b are the key hypotheses that test our contribution, that the internal division 
of innovative labor between headquarters and the host country is different for a home R&D 
project than for a host R&D project and this difference is particularly salient when the host 
country has a weak IPR. Specifically, we argue for the counterintuitive proposition that when a 
host country’s IPR is weak, the share of host inventors is likely to be lower in the host R&D 
project compared to a home R&D project, even though the host inventors likely know more 
about the host market. The reverse is most likely true when the host country’s IPR is strong. 
Hypothesis 3a compares the share of host inventors in R&D projects from the same firm, 
location, year, and technology class, but filed in the home country vs. the host country. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by differences between firms, temporal 
dynamics, or location-specific effects. Hypothesis 3b, being a differences-in-differences test, is 
also robust to these alternative explanations. Since we match patents on observable patent 
characteristics, it is also unlikely that our results are merely driven by unobserved differences 
between patents.19 
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 See also Singh and Agrawal (2011) and Qian (2007), who also use a matching process to overcome a similar 
endogeneity concern.  
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ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Alternative Explanations 
Demand patterns: It is plausible that our results are driven by unobserved differences between 
home and host patents, and between patents co-invented in India and the UK, which influence 
share of host inventors rather than IP concerns. For example, differences in patterns in demand 
across these countries may be correlated with the number of host country inventors on patents. 
Moreover, host markets with higher willingness to pay may involve more inventors from that 
host location. However, such differences in markets are unlikely to be correlated with share on 
patents filed exclusively at home. Therefore, we test our main hypothesis (H1) only on a sub-
sample of patents filed at home. From Table 5, spec 1, we see that more host inventors are 
involved from the strong IPR location than from the weak IPR location even in patents filed 
exclusively at home: (diff = 0.14, std. error = 0.00, p-value <0.01). This suggests that our results 
are unlikely to be driven entirely by differences in demand conditions across countries.  
Supply of scientific talent: It is also plausible that more host inventors are involved from the UK 
than from India because the supply of scientific talent in the UK is higher than in India. In order 
to test this alternative explanation, we test our hypotheses on a subset of patents from industries 
in which India has abundant scientific talent. Specifically, we included only patents relating to 
the information and communication technologies, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, industries in 
which India has specific expertise (Kumar and Puranam, 2012; Rezaie et. al, 2012). These three 
sectors constitute 51 percent of total Indian patent applications between 2007 and 2012 and about 
39 percent of all granted patents between 1974 and 2009. Specification 2 and 3 in Table 5 
replicate our analyses from Table 4 on this subsample. All our hypotheses are supported.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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Time-varying heterogeneity in the host country, home country, and assignee level 
Our identification strategy relies on both variation between host countries in IPR strength and 
differences in the country where the patent was filed, particularly involving Home versus Host. 
Although we control for time-invariant heterogeneity between assignees by using 746 assignee 
fixed effects and exogenous time-specific shocks using 35 filing year dummies, it is plausible 
that our results for the first two hypotheses pick up time-varying differences between assignees 
or between the host countries. For example, access to inexpensive IT and engineering talent has 
become ubiquitous in India over the past decade or so. Moreover, it is plausible that our results 
are driven by changes in the focal MNE’s strategy over time, such as increased focus on costs. 
To rule out these possibilities, we replicate our results by including time-varying assignee 
fixed effects (assignee fixed effect X time dummies) for 153 dominant assignees that account for 
about 78 percent of our total sample.20 These constitute about 5,355 time varying assignee fixed 
effects. In addition, we include 35 time varying host country dummies (Weak X time dummies). 
All our hypotheses continue to be supported. Thus we conclude that our results are unlikely to 
driven by time varying differences between assignees or differences between host destinations 
that also vary with time.21  
Alternative subsamples 
First, the sample used in the main specification includes patents that are offshored as well as 
patents that are not offshored. It is plausible that our results are driven by other unobserved 
factors that influence the decision to offshore a patent that systematically vary with the offshore 
destination. Stated otherwise, our results could be driven by a set of unobserved factors 
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 Including time-varying assignee fixed effects for all assignees would involve estimating 26,110 fixed effects. 
Given the infeasibility of this task, we include only time-varying assignee fixed effects for those assignees that hold 
at least 10 patents for innovations that were co-invented in either India or the UK. 
21
 These results and the subsequent robustness checks are shown in the supplementary note attached to this paper.  
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influencing the extreme outcomes of our dependent variable. Therefore, we replicate our entire 
analysis with a subsample that consists only of offshored patents; i.e., using patents that have at 
least one inventor from the UK or India. Our results remain qualitatively identical. 
Second, the main specification included only patents involving inventors residing in India 
to proxy for R&D offshoring to a host location with a weak IPR. Apart from India, China is the 
other major location to which R&D is offshored. In robustness checks, we also include patents 
offshored to China based on the data available from PATSTAT. These include patents assigned 
to US-based MNEs that involve at least one inventor residing in China and that were filed in 
either in the US or in China. Again, our results are qualitatively identical.  
Finally, we replicate our results by using variation in the strength of the IPR within India. 
Patents co-invented in India before the Indian patent reforms in 1994 proxy offshoring to a host 
location with a weak IPR, and patents co-invented in India after reforms proxy a host location 
with a strong IPR. We compare differences between these patents with similar differences across 
these two time periods in the UK in order to identify changes in leakage threat, similar to 
Branstetter et al (2006). Once again, we find support for all our hypotheses.22 
Specification Issues and other potential sources of bias 
Our dependent variable share is bounded between zero and one. It is plausible that a linear 
model generates predictions outside the interval, especially for extreme values of the regressor. 
We therefore check the robustness of our results using a fractional logit specification with robust 
standard errors (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Our results are unchanged.23  
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 This specification uses variation within the host location (India) over time. Since very few patents were filed 
exclusively in India before patent reforms, we had to impose a structure on the data to test our hypotheses. We used 
1994 as the IP reform date since there was significant uncertainty regarding whether India was going to sign the 
TRIPS agreement at that time. Therefore, it is unlikely that MNEs in India were prepared to take advantage of this 
reform. In contrast, the 2004 reform was widely anticipated and therefore MNEs could be prepared to involve more 
host inventors on subsequent projects.  
23
 These robustness checks are shown in the supplementary note accompanying this paper.  
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Our results, especially for H1 and H2, rely on comparing share on patents co-invented in 
India with patents co-invented in the UK. It is plausible that the internal division of innovative 
labor is driven by factors other than the strength of the IPR at the host location. For example, the 
differences in share may just reflect the fact that the UK subsidiary may be more integrated in 
the MNE’s knowledge network relative to the Indian subsidiary or R&D collaboration with the 
UK subsidiary could be in different technological areas relative to R&D collaboration with the 
Indian subsidiary. However, our CEM procedure should minimize these concerns. Note that we 
not only match patents based on several observable patent characteristics, such as technology 
class, innovating team size, but also on forward and backward citation patterns that proxy for the 
density of knowledge networks between the subsidiary and headquarters. Moreover, our results 
are qualitatively similar even when we include dummies that vary by both host country and time. 
A related issue is that our results may also reflect the changing ability of subsidiaries to 
take on more complex projects over time. Like much of the prior work (Singh, 2008; Alnuaimi et 
al., 2012a; Lahiri, 2010), we do not control for time-varying subsidiary-specific effects due to 
not having sufficient degrees of freedom. However, many of our hypotheses, such as H3a and 
H3b, rely on within-host location, within-year comparisons. It is unlikely that subsidiary ability 
would differentially impact home versus host R&D projects. Moreover matching patents filed in 
different countries based on their technology class, forward ratio and backward ratios within an 
assignee-filing year cohort rules out the possibility of differential knowledge-bases between 
locations within a time cohort. We should note that our matching process takes into account self-
citations made to/from the headquarters location (i.e., the US). This helps us rule out alternative 
explanations that suggest that our results derive from systematic differences in patents invented 
across these locations, such as differences in technological sophistication of the work.  
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DISCUSSION 
The internationalization of R&D activity by MNEs has been an active topic of research for the 
past 50 years, with the pace of scholarly interest picking up in the past 20 years, given the 
significant increase in foreign R&D conducted by MNEs. Whereas much prior work has 
discussed R&D internationalization in the context of the most developed countries, such as the 
USA, Canada, Western Europe and Japan (Kuemmerle, 1999b; Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen, 
2011), the most recent and exciting trend is the growing presence of emerging economies, such 
as China and India, on the MNE R&D map (Zhao, 2006; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). We 
believe this recent trend presents MNE managers with a tradeoff: While relatively inexpensive 
labor costs at these destinations provide opportunities for cost arbitrage, the weak IPRs at these 
destinations also makes the appropriability of IP a challenge. It is from this perspective that our 
study makes novel contributions. 
We ask how the internal division of innovative labor between the headquarters and 
foreign subsidiaries of MNEs changes with the changing strength of the IPR at the host location. 
Interestingly, most prior studies on MNE R&D strategy have not studied precisely the factors 
that influence the internal division of innovative labor. Early studies argued that R&D centers in 
host locations customized technologies developed at home to suit local market needs (Mansfield 
et al., 1979; Rugman, 1981). Later studies argued that MNEs may also establish foreign R&D 
centers to access specialized skills and technologies available there that perhaps are not readily 
available at home (Almeida, 1996). Investigating the internal division of innovative labor is 
perhaps redundant under these conditions because these studies assume that there is very little 
overlap in knowledge across the different locations. However, evidence from patent data shows 
that MNEs primarily establish international R&D centers to access knowledge that is also 
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available at home (Patel and Vega, 1999; Bas and Sierra, 2002) and that most subsidiaries 
simultaneously draw from and contribute to R&D at headquarters (Criscuolo, Narula and 
Verspagen, 2007). This pattern is true for both US MNEs investing in the European Union and 
vice versa. The recent phenomenon of offshoring R&D further suggests that often the explicit 
motive for offshoring is to access lower-cost talent that is similar in quality to that available at 
the headquarters (Lewin et al., 2009; Kumar and Puranam, 2012). Understanding the internal 
division of innovative labor becomes more important under these conditions, especially when a 
great deal of R&D is performed in locations with a weak IPR, which poses a threat to value 
appropriation from such R&D. 
Our empirical investigation leads to two conclusions. First, on average, the internal 
division of innovative labor is such that fewer host inventors from locations with a weaker IPR 
are involved in an MNE R&D project. Involving fewer inventors reduces the threat of IP 
leakage, though at the additional cost of involving more inventors from the home country, who 
are more expensive. Second, the influence of the strength of the host country’s IPR on the 
internal division of innovative labor is greater when the R&D is aimed at the host market and 
less when aimed at the home market. In our empirical results, we find that the host country’s IPR 
strength has a smaller influence on the internal division of innovative labor in R&D aimed at the 
home market; in contrast, the influence of the host’s IPR strength on host R&D projects is almost 
10 times as large. It is also interesting to note that in our sample there is no difference in the 
internal division of labor between home and host R&D projects conducted at locations with a 
strong IPR. In sum, a strong IPR is just as necessary for the efficient division of innovative labor 
within firms between multiple R&D centers, as it is between firms. 
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Our results refine findings from prior studies on the influence of IPR strength on R&D 
offshoring. Unlike prior work, we show that the extent to which a weak IPR in the host country 
imposes an appropriability threat to an MNE depends on where the output of the R&D project is 
used. Innovations produced for the host market entail the risk of the expropriation of both 
patented and unpatented knowledge, whereas inventions produced for the home market, which 
has a strong IPR, entail the risk of expropriation of only unpatented knowledge. Consequently, 
inventions intended for host markets with a weak IPR have lower levels of host inventor 
participation compared to those aimed at the home market. By analyzing only patents filed in the 
host country (Branstetter et al., 2006) or only in the home country (Zhao, 2006), prior work does 
not present a complete picture of how IPR strength influences the globalization of MNE R&D. 
In addition, though prior work claims that a weak IPR at the host location significantly 
impedes R&D offshoring there, it does not explicitly take into account the ‘local’ nature of IP 
laws. Therefore, is not explicit about how a weak IPR at the host location imposes an IP leakage 
threat to inventions intended for the global market or elucidate the mechanisms by which leakage 
occurs. Our theory, similar to that of Branstetter et al. (2006), assumes that the mechanism of 
leakage is through the hiring away of the focal MNE’s employees by its competitors to access 
the tacit knowledge underlying its inventions. Our theory suggests that for home R&D projects, 
the leakage of trade secrets at the host location is the main threat to the MNE’s IP. This 
distinction between different forms of IP protection—patents versus trade secrets—and how they 
influence different kinds of R&D has not been previously studied. 
Our results also have significant managerial implications, especially for MNE managers 
looking to capitalize on the relatively cheap innovation talent available in weak-IPR countries. 
Our results suggest that both patents and trade secrecy matter, albeit differentially, depending on 
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whether the fruits of the R&D are utilized in the home or offshore markets. Thus our paper 
provides significant guidance for an MNE manager to decide upon the extent of offshoring R&D 
and considerations to keep in mind when selecting projects for offshoring to weak-IPR locations. 
Our results have interesting policy implications as well. A country’s IPR is a significant 
component of its national innovation system (Pavitt and Patel, 1999); though MNE R&D has 
globalized, national innovation systems, especially IPRs, remain strictly local (Carlsson, 2006). 
Our findings suggest that although other components of national innovation systems may 
influence the nature of R&D work conducted by MNEs at the host location, IPRs seem to mainly 
act as a deterrent to MNEs working on technologies that are particularly relevant to that host 
country. Contrary to implications from prior studies that a weak IPR may impede technology 
transfer and therefore the technological development of the offshore country (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1993), our results suggest that when IPR is weak, although the host locations may 
work on cutting-edge technology insofar as it is more relevant to the home market, host countries 
may not benefit from such activity since they will likely be irrelevant for the host market. 
As with most work, ours also has limitations, many of which we discussed and attempted 
to mitigate in the section on robustness checks. Our main limitation is imposed by the nature of 
the data. Our analysis is based on the location of inventors listed on patents and the location in 
which its assignee(s) opted to file. We thus lack the details on the actual characteristics of the 
R&D project, as well as the details of all the R&D personnel involved. In addition, we do not 
explicitly measure IPR strength and rely on variation between host locations. However, our 
results appear robust to several alternative empirical specifications and controls, which boosts 
our confidence in our results. 
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Despite these limitations, we believe the paper contributes in a novel way to 
understanding MNE R&D strategies, especially the internal division of innovative labor in the 
MNE. We show that when the MNE’s talent base is scattered across geographies that vary in 
their IPR strength, the internal division of innovative labor is sensitive not just to the nature of 
R&D, but also to the strength of the IPR at the host location. In fact, the influence of the IPR 
strength is high enough to counter the intuitive notion that host inventors are more likely work on 
host R&D projects and home investors are more likely to work on home R&D projects. We thus 
hope that our paper inspires more such work to provide deeper insight on the implications of how 
MNEs manage institutional voids (such as a poor IPR) across countries to create competitive 
advantage.  
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Table 1A. Details of the sample used in this study 
Description N 
Total patents held by US assignees with at least one offshored patent in India and the UK 138,685 
Total patents after matching offshored and non-offshored patents 
  95,477 
Total patents after matching patents co-invented in the UK and those that were co-invented in 
India (final sample) 
  53,320 
Total offshored patents   15,397 
Total non-offshored patents   37,923 
 
Table 1B. Patents, by offshore and filing location 
  Offshore location   
  India  UK Total 
Home 3,288 4,003  7,292 
Host 249 1,698  1,847 
Both 467 2,304  2,771 
Neither 2,308 1,077  3,387 
Total patents 6,314 9,083 15,397 
 
Notes: The home category comprises patents that were filed in the country in which the assignee was also a 
resident. The offshore category comprises patents that were filed exclusively at the offshore location. The 
category “both” comprises patents that were filed both at home and at the offshore location. The “neither” 
category comprises patents that were filed neither at home nor at the offshore location but elsewhere. 
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Table 2. Descriptions of measures 
Variable Description Source of variation N Mean Std. 
dev. 
Share Offshore inventors divided by total number of 
inventors 
Patent, firm, offshore 
location, filing year, 
filing location, 
technological class, 
industry and year 
53320 0.07 0.24 
Weak IPR = 1 if the focal patent was offshored to India Host location 53320 0.12 0.31 
Strong IPR = 1 if the focal patent was offshored to the UK Host location 53320 0.17 0.31 
Home  = 1 if the patent was co-invented in India or the 
UK and was filed exclusively in the US and zero 
otherwise 
Filing location 53320 0.14 0.64 
Host = 1 if a patent was co-invented in India or the UK 
and was filed exclusively in the same host 
country at which they were co-invented and zero 
otherwise 
Filing location 53320 0.04 0.18 
Both  = 1 if the patent was co-invented in India or the 
UK and was filed both at the US and the 
destination at which they were co-invented 
Filing location 53320 0.05 0.13 
Neither = 1 if the focal patent was co-invented in India or 
the UK and was neither filed in the US nor in the 
destination at which they were co-invented 
Filing location 53320 0.06 0.38 
Backward ratio Backward self-citations divided by the total 
number of backward citations  
Patent  53071a 0.39 
 
0.45 
Forward ratio Forward self-citations divided by the total number 
of forward citations 
Patent 53071a 0.50 0.48 
Industry dummies 28 three-digit SIC code dummy variables Industry -   
Filing year 
dummy 
35 dummies, one for each year between 1974 and 
2009 
Filing year -   
Firm fixed effects 746 firm fixed effects  Firm -   
Originality Originality of a patent Patent 53253a 0.63 0.58 
Generality Generality of a patent Patent 53253a 0.49 0.47 
Log claims Natural log number of claims on a patent  Patent 51305b 2.77 2.58 
R&D over sales Yearly R&D of the assignee divided by sales Firm, year 52181c 0.03 3.78 
Log(employees) # employees of the assignee in a year Firm, year 52181c 0.67 0.63 
      
a We were not able to calculate the forward and backward ratios for 249 Indian patents due to missing data. For 
these patents we assigned the average ratio relating to Indian patents for the filing year cohort.  
b We were unable to obtain the number of claims for 2,015 patents. In regressions we control for missing values 
using a dummy that equals one when the number of claims was missing for the patent. 
c For 39 assignees, the ratio of R&D over sales and employees was missing. Our regressions control for missing 
values using a dummy that equals one when the ratio of R&D over sales and employees was missing for the patent. 
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Table 3. Comparison of shares, by filing location and by offshore location 
 
 
                         Filing location  
Host location Home Host Diff. (host – home) 
Weak  0.84 0.62 -0.22*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) 
Strong  0.87 0.90 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diff (weak – strong) -0.03*** -0.28***  -0.25*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table 4. Effect of IPR strength at the host location on the share of host inventors 
 
 Spec.1 Spec.2 Spec.3 Spec. 4 
Weak  ,  0.65 (0.00)***  0.65 (0.00)***  0.65 (0.00)*** -0.09 (0.00)*** 
Weak*Home β2    -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Weak*Host β3    -0.19 (0.02)*** 
Strong   0.79 (0.00)***  0.79 (0.00)***  0.79 (0.00)***  
Home     0.90 (0.00)*** 
Host  β5     0.89 (0.01)*** 
Both  β6     0.68 (0.00)*** 
Neither  β7     0.85 (0.00)*** 
Forward ratio    0.01 (0.00)***  0.00 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)*** 
Backward ratio   -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
(1-no claims)*log claims  -0.01 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)* 
Claims not found dummy   0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)***  0.01(0.00)*** 
Originality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Generality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00)*** 
R&D over sales     0.02 (0.00)***  0.01(0.00)*** 
R&D not found dummy    -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Log(employees)    -0.08 (0.00)*** -0.07 (0.00)*** 
Constant  -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (0.07) -0.00 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) 
N   53,320 53,320 53,320 53,320 
Assignee fixed effects (746)  Y Y Y Y 
2-digit SIC code dummies (28)  Y Y Y Y 
Filing year dummies (35)  Y Y Y Y 
Within R-squared  0.69 0.69 0.69 0.71 
Test for H1: (α1 - α2)  -0.14 (0.00)*** -0.14 (0.00)*** -0.14 (0.00)***  
Test for H2: β3     -0.19(0.02)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)     -0.18(0.03)*** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)      -0.17(0.02)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Test for H3b: {[(β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)]- (β5 - β4)} = (β3 – β2).  
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Table 5. Effect of IPR strength at the host location on the share of host inventors 
 
  
Only patents 
filed at Home 
Only ICT, chemicals and 
pharmaceutical patents 
 Spec. 1 Spec.2 Spec. 3 
Weak  ,  0.73 (0.00)***  0.66 (0.00)*** -0.08 (0.00)*** 
Weak X Home β2   -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Weak X Host β3   -0.20 (0.02)*** 
Strong    0.87 (0.00)***  0.78 (0.00)***  
Home Β4    0.90 (0.01)*** 
Host  β5    0.86 (0.01)*** 
Both  β6    0.69 (0.00)*** 
Neither  β7    0.86 (0.01)*** 
Forward ratio    0.00 (0.00)  0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)*** 
Backward ratio   -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
(1-no claims)*log claims  -0.00 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)* 
Claims not found dummy   0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)**  0.00 (0.00)*** 
Originality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Generality  -0.00 (0.00)** -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
R&D over sales   0.02 (0.00)***  0.02 (0.00)***  0.03(0.00)*** 
R&D not found dummy  -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02) 
Log(employees)  -0.07 (0.00)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.00)*** 
Constant  -0.00 (0.05) -0.00 (0.11) -0.01 (0.11) 
N   45215 31992 31992 
Assignee fixed effects   746 476 476 
2-digit SIC code dummies (28)  Y Y Y 
Filing year dummies (35)  Y Y Y 
Within R-squared  0.64 0.63 0.69 
Test for H1: (α1 - α2)  -0.14 (0.00)*** -0.12 (0.00)***  
Test for H2: β3    -0.20(0.02)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)     -0.22(0.03)*** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)     -0.18(0.02)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Supplementary note 
Table A-1. Statistics of matched and unmatched samples 
 
  Before matching After matching 
Variable Offshore Not offshore Diff. Offshore Not offshore Diff. 
Number of inventors 3.12 2.41 0.71 2.51 2.46 0.05 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Forward ratio 0.64 0.48 0.16 0.66 0.70 -0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Backward ratio 0.45 0.38 0.07 0.47 0.48 -0.01 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log claims*(1-claims not found) 17.64 16.11 1.53 15.90 15.52 0.38 
(0.11) (0.03) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14) (0.23) 
Claims not found 0.48 0.23 0.25 0.42 0.32 0.10 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overall distance 0.91 0.33 
  Before matching After matching 
Variable India UK Diff. India UK Diff. 
Number of inventors 3.42 2.93 0.49 3.06 2.91 0.15 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Forward ratio 0.72 0.59 0.13 0.77 0.70 0.07 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Backward ratio 0.48 0.42 0.06 0.39 0.48 -0.09 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Log claims*(1-claims not found) 15.49 12.47 3.02 12.43 15.52 -3.09 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24) 
Claims not found 0.48 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.32 0.02 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Overall distance 0.74     0.29     
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Table A-2. The effect of IPR strength at the host location on the share of host inventors, with time-
varying controls 
 
Parameter Spec.1 Spec. 2 
Weak ,  0.65 (0.00)*** -0.10 (0.00)*** 
Weak*Home β2  -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Weak*Host β3  -0.19 (0.02)*** 
Strong  0.79 (0.00)***  
Home β4  0.89 (0.01)*** 
Host β5  0.87 (0.01)*** 
Both β6  0.70 (0.00)*** 
Neither β7  0.77 (0.00)*** 
Forward ratio  0.01 (0.00)*** 0.01 (0.00)*** 
Backward ratio  -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
(1-no claims)*log claims  -0.01 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00)* 
Claims not found dummy  0.01 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.01)** 
Originality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Generality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Constant  0.02 (0.09) 0.03 (0.10) 
N  53,320 53,320 
Assignee fixed effects  153 153 
2-digit SIC code dummies   28 28 
Filing year dummies   35 35 
Filing year X co-invented at weak  35 35 
Filing year X assignee fixed effects  5,355 5,355 
Within R-squared  0.84 0.86 
Test for H1: (α1 - α2)  -0.14 (0.00)***  
Test for H2: β3   -0.19 (0.02)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)   -0.19 (0.03)*** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)   -0.17 (0.02)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A-3. Effect of IPR strength at host location on share of host inventors, offshored patents only 
 
  
Parameter Spec.1 Spec. 2 
Weak  ,  -0.10 (0.01)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** 
Weak X Home β2  -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Weak X Host β3   -0.13 (0.03)*** 
Home β%  0.06 (0.01)*** 
Host β5  -0.09 (0.02)*** 
Both β6  -0.19 (0.01)*** 
Forward ratio    0.04 (0.01)***   0.05 (0.01)*** 
Backward ratio  -0.11 (0.01)*** -0.11 (0.01)*** 
Claims not found dummy    0.00 (0.00)   0.00 (0.00) 
(1-claims not found) X log claims   -0.03 (0.02)**  -0.03 (0.02)** 
Originality   -0.07(0.01)***  -0.07(0.01)*** 
Generality   -0.05(0.01)***  -0.05(0.01)*** 
R&D over sales    0.02(0.00)***   0.02(0.00)*** 
R&D not found dummy   -0.01 (0.02)  -0.01 (0.02) 
Log(employees)   -0.20 (0.02)***  -0.21 (0.02)*** 
Constant   1.41 (0.44)***  1.30 (0.43)*** 
N  15,397 15,397 
Assignee fixed effects (746)  Y Y 
2 digit SIC code dummies (28)  Y Y 
Filing year dummies (35)  Y Y 
Within R-Squared  0.17 0.20 
Test for H1: α1  -0.10 (0.01)***  
Test for H2: β3   -0.13 (0.03)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)    -0.25 (0.04)*** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)    -0.10 (0.03)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table A-4. Effect of IPR strength at host location on share of host inventors, including China 
patents24 
 
  
Parameter Spec.1 Spec. 2 
Weak  ,  0.65 (0.00)*** -0.09 (0.00)*** 
Weak X Home β2  -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Weak X Host β3   -0.11 (0.02)*** 
Strong  0.79 (0.00)***  
Home β%  0.90 (0.00)*** 
Host β5  0.88 (0.00)*** 
Both β6  0.69 (0.00)*** 
Neither β7  0.85 (0.00)*** 
Forward ratio   0.00 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)*** 
Backward ratio  -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Claims not found dummy  -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)* 
(1-claims not found) X log claims   0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)*** 
Originality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Generality  -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
R&D over sales   0.02 (0.00)***  0.02 (0.00)*** 
R&D not found dummy  -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Log(employees)  -0.08 (0.00)*** -0.07 (0.00)*** 
Constant  -0.00 (0.07) -0.01 (0.06) 
N  55438 55438 
Assignee fixed effects (746)  Y Y 
2 digit SIC code dummies (28)  Y Y 
Filing year dummies (35)  Y Y 
Within R-Squared  0.69 0.71 
Test for H1: (α1 - α2)  -0.14 (0.01)***  
Test for H2: β3   -0.11 (0.02)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)    -0.11 (0.02)*** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)    -0.09 (0.02)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
  
                                                           
24
 Since PATSTAT may not capture the universe of Chinese co-invented or filed patents, we do not use this as our 
main specification.   
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Table A-5. Effect of IPR strength at host location on share of foreign inventors, using IP reforms in 
India 
  Parameter (1) (2) 
Invented in India period 1 η1 0.55 (0.01)***  
Invented in India period 2 η2 0.72 (0.00)***  
Invented in the UK period 1 η3 0.70 (0.01)***  
Invented in the UK period 2 η4 0.78 (0.00)***  
Invented in India in period 1 filed at Home τ1  0.65 (0.01)*** 
Invented in India in period 2 filed at Home τ2  0.70 (0.01)*** 
Invented in the UK in period 1 filed at Home  τ3  0.82 (0.00)*** 
Invented in the UK in period 2 filed at Home τ4  0.90 (0.01)*** 
Invented in India and filed at Host τ5  0.55 (0.05)*** 
Invented in the UK and filed at Host τ6  0.80 (0.00)*** 
Invented in India in period 1 filed at both  τ7  0.38 (0.03)*** 
Invented in India in period 2 filed at both τ8  0.60 (0.01)*** 
Invented in the UK in period 1 filed at both τ9  0.81 (0.01)*** 
Invented in the UK in period 2 filed at both τ10  0.80 (0.01)*** 
Invented in India filed at neither τ11  0.51 (0.01)*** 
Invented in the UK filed at neither τ12  0.61 (0.01)*** 
Forward ratio   0.00 (0.00)***  0.00 (0.00)*** 
Backward ratio  -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Number of claims X (1- claims not found) -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)* 
Claims not found dummy  0.01 (0.00)***  0.01 (0.00)*** 
Originality -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
Generality -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.01 (0.00)*** 
R&D over sales X (1-employee not found)  0.02 (0.00)***  0.02 (0.00)*** 
Employee not found dummy -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Log employees X (1-employee not found) -0.08 (0.00)*** -0.07 (0.00)*** 
Constant    0.00 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.08) 
Observations 53320 53320 
Assignee fixed effects(746) Y Y 
Industry dummies(28) Y Y 
Within R-Squared 0.61 0.64 
H1: (η1 – η2) - (η3 – η4) -0.09 (0.01)***  
H2: {(τ7 – τ1) - (τ8 – τ2)}-{(τ9 – τ3) – (τ10 – τ4)} -0.26 (0.04)*** 
H3a: (τ7 – 2τ1) - (τ9 – 2τ3) -0.09 (0.03)*** 
H3b:{(τ7 – 2τ1) - (τ8 – 2τ2) }-{(τ9 – 2τ3) - (τ10 – 2τ4)} -0.29 (0.05)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  
Notes: India has a stronger IPR in Period 2. The tests compute the difference in threat of IP leakage, which is 
correlated to share, between period 1 and period 2 on patents co-invented in India and compare this to the similar 
difference to patents co-invented in the UK. This procedure removes the change in threat that is purely due to time 
variation. This draws on the identification procedure used by Branstetter et al (2006) and Lerner (2009). Since very 
few patents are filed exclusively in India before patent reform, we need to impose a structure on the data to identify 
the host threat. We do this by subtracting the home threat from patents that are filed in both home and host.  
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Table A-6. Fractional logit regressions of the effect of IPR strength at the host location on share of 
host inventors 
 
Spec.1 Spec. 2 
  
Weak=1 Strong=1 
Weak 6.49 (0.09)***   
Strong 7.73 (0.09)***   
Home  11.20 (0.32)*** 13.18 (0.18)*** 
Host  9.34 (0.51)*** 13.05 (0.16)*** 
Both  6.71(0.21)*** 7.13 (0.15)*** 
Neither  9.91(0.21)*** 12.71 (0.11)*** 
Forward ratio 0.07(0.03)** 0.22(0.09)*** 0.63 (0.08)*** 
Backward ratio -0.58 (0.06)*** -0.30(0.15)*** -0.59 (0.07)*** 
(1-no. claims) X log claims -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Claims not found dummy 0.03 (0.02)* 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02)* 
Originality -0.27 (0.04)*** -0.57(0.11)*** -0.58 (0.05)*** 
Generality -0.13 (0.05)*** -0.18(0.06)*** -0.83 (0.07)*** 
R&D over sales 0.19 (0.00)** 0.12 (0.01)*** 0.15 (0.05)*** 
R&D not found dummy -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.09) -0.01 (0.01) 
Log(employees) -1.67 (0.19)*** -1.99 (0.32)*** -1.40 (0.31)*** 
Constant -29.47 (31.23) -16.32 (21.19) -37.47 (29.41) 
N 53,320 44,237 47,006 
Assignee fixed effects(746) Y Y Y 
2-digit SIC code dummies (28) Y Y Y 
Filing year dummies (35) 35 35 35 
LL -5,974.39 -4,260.53 -4,617.67 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table A-6-1: Estimated impacts from Table A-3 
 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
Test for H1: (α1 - α2) -0.09 (0.01)***  
Test for H2: β3  -0.19 (0.02)*** 
Test for H3a: (β3 + β5) - (β2 + β4)   -0.17 (0.08)** 
Test for H3b: (β3 – β2)   -0.16 (0.03)*** 
The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Standard errors calculated using delta method are in parentheses. The interpretation is based on predicted values and 
their standard errors, as illustrated by Baum, (2008). 
 
 
 
